kalshiMay 12, 202617h agoWho will be Trump's next Attorney General? (Todd Blanche)
Will Todd Blanche be Trump's next Attorney General before January 20, 2029?
Signal
NO TRADE
Probability
52%
Confidence
MEDIUM
55%
Summary.
As of May 12, 2026, Todd Blanche has served as Acting Attorney General for 40 days following Trump's April 2 firing of Pam Bondi, but has NOT been formally nominated for the permanent position. My estimated probability that Blanche will be the first new permanent AG is 52%, marginally above the market's 47.5%. This reflects a slight incumbency advantage—Blanche is aggressively implementing Trump's DOJ priorities and has prior Senate confirmability as Deputy AG—but the 40-day delay without nomination signals genuine consideration of alternatives like Lee Zeldin. The critical risk is the resolution criteria's path dependency: ANY other AG appointment before Blanche (even temporarily) resolves the market to NO, and with 2.7 years remaining until the deadline, Trump's historically extreme cabinet turnover creates meaningful multi-appointment scenarios. The market appears reasonably well-calibrated on this near coin-flip situation, with Trump's "audition" framing suggesting genuine evaluation rather than a predetermined outcome.
Reasoning.
Temporal Context (May 12, 2026): Todd Blanche has been Acting Attorney General for 40 days (since April 2, 2026) following Trump's firing of Pam Bondi. Trump has NOT yet formally nominated Blanche for the permanent position, despite the "audition" framing.
Key Analysis:
-
Current Status Creates Path Dependency:
- Blanche is already in the role as Acting AG and aggressively implementing Trump's priorities
- He previously secured Senate confirmation as Deputy AG (March 2025), demonstrating confirmability
- The "audition" framing suggests Trump is genuinely evaluating performance, not dismissing candidacy
- 40 days without nomination is concerning but not fatal - allows time for vetting and political calculus
-
Supporting Factors for YES (Blanche becomes permanent AG first):
- Incumbency advantage: Already executing the role and aligning DOJ with Trump priorities
- Proven loyalty: Served as Trump's personal defense attorney in 2024 criminal cases
- Senate confirmability: Already confirmed once as Deputy AG
- Trump's preference for lawyers who defended him personally
- Aggressive early actions signal Blanche is "passing" the audition
-
Factors Against YES:
- Lee Zeldin is a credible competing candidate with Trump loyalty credentials
- 40 days without formal nomination suggests Trump is seriously considering alternatives
- Trump's extreme cabinet turnover creates path dependency risk: ANY other AG appointment before Blanche = NO resolution
- Resolution requires Blanche to be FIRST new permanent AG - even if Blanche eventually gets the job after someone else, market resolves NO
- 2.7 years until deadline allows for multiple AG appointments given Trump's pattern
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Critical Resolution Criteria Risk: The market structure heavily penalizes scenarios where Trump appoints someone else first (even temporarily) before potentially appointing Blanche later. With Trump's high turnover rate and 2.7 years remaining, there's material risk of:
- Trump appointing Zeldin or another loyalist first
- That appointment not working out
- Trump then turning to Blanche in 2027-2028
- Market still resolves NO despite Blanche eventually becoming AG
-
Calibration Against Market: Current market odds of 47.5% appear well-calibrated but slightly underweight Blanche's incumbency advantage. The "audition" framing and aggressive policy implementation suggest probability slightly above 50%. However, the 40-day delay and Zeldin competition prevent confidence above 55%.
Probability Estimate: 52% This reflects:
- Slight incumbency advantage over market's 47.5%
- Real competition from Zeldin (~30% probability of being nominated first)
- Small probability (~15-18%) of Trump appointing someone else entirely in the 2.7-year window before returning to Blanche or choosing a third candidate
- Recognition that market is reasonably efficient on political personnel decisions
The estimate is only marginally above market, reflecting genuine uncertainty and the market's reasonable calibration.
Key Factors.
Blanche's incumbency advantage as Acting AG for 40 days with aggressive Trump-aligned actions
Trump has NOT formally nominated Blanche despite 40 days, suggesting genuine consideration of alternatives
Lee Zeldin as credible competing candidate with Trump loyalty credentials
Resolution criteria requires FIRST new permanent AG - any other appointment before Blanche resolves to NO
2.7 years remaining until deadline creates multiple-appointment risk given Trump's high turnover pattern
Blanche's prior Senate confirmation as Deputy AG demonstrates confirmability
Trump's 'audition' framing suggests genuine performance evaluation rather than placeholder status
Scenarios.
Bull Case: Blanche Confirmed as Permanent AG
52%Trump formally nominates Blanche within the next 2-4 weeks after evaluating his performance as Acting AG. Blanche successfully navigates Senate confirmation (likely given prior Deputy AG confirmation) and becomes the first new permanent Attorney General after Bondi. His aggressive alignment with Trump priorities during the audition period convinces Trump he's the right choice.
Trigger: Formal nomination announcement from White House; positive Trump statements about Blanche's performance; Senate Judiciary Committee scheduling confirmation hearings; absence of viable alternative candidates gaining momentum
Base Case: Zeldin or Alternative Appointed First
33%Trump decides to nominate Lee Zeldin or another loyalist instead of Blanche as the permanent AG. This could happen if Trump concludes the 'audition' wasn't successful, or if he prefers a different political profile. Blanche either remains as Acting AG temporarily or returns to another role. The market resolves NO because Blanche was not the FIRST new permanent AG.
Trigger: White House leaks indicating Trump cooling on Blanche; Zeldin or other candidate meeting frequently with Trump; formal nomination of someone other than Blanche; reporting that Trump found Blanche's audition lacking
Bear Case: Multiple AG Appointments Before Deadline
15%Given Trump's historically high cabinet turnover, he cycles through multiple AG appointments between now and January 2029. Even if Blanche eventually becomes AG, if ANY other person becomes permanent AG first, the market resolves NO. This scenario captures the path dependency risk inherent in the resolution criteria combined with Trump's pattern of firing cabinet officials.
Trigger: Trump nominates someone else (Zeldin, etc.) as permanent AG; that person serves for months then is fired or resigns; Trump then considers Blanche again; continued pattern of Trump cabinet instability
Risks.
40-day delay without formal nomination may signal Trump already decided against Blanche
Lee Zeldin or other loyalist could gain momentum and secure nomination within weeks
Senate composition unknown - potential confirmation obstacles not analyzed in research
Resolution criteria path dependency: even eventual Blanche appointment resolves NO if anyone else appointed first
Trump's extreme unpredictability and high cabinet turnover rate creates multiple-AG-appointment scenarios
Research lacks insider White House reporting on Trump's current AG decision-making process
Blanche's aggressive DOJ actions could backfire politically and hurt confirmation prospects
Geopolitical or domestic crisis could prompt Trump to seek different AG profile than Blanche offers
Edge Assessment.
Minimal Edge - Market Reasonably Calibrated
Current market odds: 47.5% Estimated probability: 52% Difference: +4.5 percentage points
The market appears reasonably well-calibrated on this political personnel decision. My estimate of 52% reflects only a slight edge based on:
-
Incumbency advantage underweighted: Blanche's 40 days as Acting AG with aggressive Trump-aligned performance creates meaningful path dependency that market may slightly undervalue
-
"Audition" framing signals genuine consideration: Trump's explicit framing suggests real evaluation rather than placeholder status, supporting probability above 50%
-
Confirmability advantage: Prior Senate confirmation as Deputy AG reduces one major risk factor
However, the edge is MINIMAL (4.5 points) because:
- Market has correctly identified this as near coin-flip scenario
- 40-day delay without nomination is genuinely concerning signal
- Lee Zeldin represents credible alternative
- Resolution criteria creates significant path dependency risk
- 2.7-year timeline allows multiple AG appointments
Recommendation: At market odds of 47.5%, there is slight value on YES at 52% estimate, but the edge is too small to warrant strong conviction given the 0.55 confidence level and significant uncertainty. This is essentially a fairly-priced market with marginal inefficiency. Only bet if transaction costs and risk tolerance permit thin-edge opportunities.
The market's efficiency likely reflects: (1) transparent public information about Trump personnel decisions, (2) political prediction market sophistication on cabinet appointments, (3) genuine uncertainty in Trump's decision-making process.
What Would Change Our Mind.
Trump formally nominates Blanche for permanent AG within the next 2-4 weeks, converting incumbency advantage into concrete commitment
White House leaks or reporting indicating Trump has decided against Blanche or is actively interviewing Lee Zeldin or other candidates
Senate Judiciary Committee schedules confirmation hearings for Blanche, signaling nomination is imminent
Trump makes public statements praising or criticizing Blanche's performance as Acting AG during the 'audition' period
Lee Zeldin or another candidate receives formal nomination for Attorney General, immediately resolving uncertainty
Reporting on Senate whip counts showing unexpected confirmation obstacles for Blanche despite prior Deputy AG confirmation
Major DOJ policy action or controversy involving Blanche that significantly affects Trump's evaluation
Extension of Acting AG period beyond 60-90 days without nomination, suggesting Trump has likely decided on an alternative
Sources.
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