Will Andrew Bailey be Trump's next Attorney General?
Will Andrew Bailey be the first new person to serve as Attorney General under Trump before January 20, 2029?
Signal
NO TRADE
Probability
1%
Confidence
HIGH
85%
Summary.
The market prices Andrew Bailey becoming Trump's next Attorney General at 1.85%, while my analysis estimates only 0.5% probability. Todd Blanche is currently serving as Acting AG (since April 2, 2026) and was formally nominated for permanent appointment on June 8, 2026—just 10 days ago—with Senate confirmation hearings now underway. Andrew Bailey holds a completely different position as FBI Co-Deputy Director and has zero public indication of AG consideration. For Bailey to become AG, Blanche's nomination would need to fail (<5% historical base rate for AG nominees absent scandal), Trump would then need to select Bailey over dozens of other candidates (~2% conditional probability), and Bailey would need Senate confirmation (~80% if nominated). This chain yields roughly 0.08% probability. Additionally, there's significant ambiguity about whether Blanche's Acting AG status already disqualifies Bailey from being the "first new person" to serve as AG, which could make the true probability near-zero. The market's slight premium over my estimate (1.35 percentage points) likely reflects legitimate uncertainty about resolution criteria, Trump administration unpredictability given Bondi's April firing, and liquidity dynamics on low-probability events. This represents a weak edge at best—the market appears approximately correctly calibrated for this extremely unlikely outcome.
Reasoning.
Step-by-Step Analysis (as of June 18, 2026)
1. Current Situation Assessment
- Todd Blanche is currently serving as Acting Attorney General (since April 2, 2026)
- Blanche was formally nominated for permanent AG on June 8, 2026 (10 days ago)
- He is actively undergoing Senate confirmation hearings
- Andrew Bailey is serving as Co-Deputy Director of the FBI (since September 2025)
- There is ZERO public indication that Bailey is being considered for Attorney General
2. Resolution Criteria Analysis The market resolves YES only if Andrew Bailey is the "first NEW person to serve as Attorney General" before January 20, 2029. This creates a critical question: Does Todd Blanche's current Acting AG status already disqualify Bailey from being "first"?
Interpretation 1 (Most Likely): If "Acting AG" counts as "serving," then Blanche has ALREADY become the first new AG after Bondi's firing in April 2026. This would mean Bailey cannot possibly be "first" - the market should resolve NO immediately or upon Blanche's confirmation.
Interpretation 2 (Less Likely): Only a Senate-confirmed, permanent AG counts. In this case, Bailey would need:
- Blanche's nomination to fail or be withdrawn
- Trump to then nominate Bailey instead
- Bailey to be confirmed by the Senate
3. Probability Assessment for Bailey Becoming AG
Base Rate Analysis:
- Historical precedent: When a sitting Acting official is formally nominated by POTUS, withdrawal/rejection rate is <5% absent major scandal
- No evidence of scandal, opposition, or problems with Blanche nomination
- Bailey has no apparent connection to AG consideration - he's in a completely different role (FBI)
Pathway Requirements for YES Resolution:
- Blanche nomination fails/withdrawn (estimated 5% probability)
- AND Trump decides to nominate Bailey instead of other candidates (estimated 2% probability - Bailey is one of many possible alternatives)
- AND Bailey is confirmed by Senate (estimated 80% probability if nominated)
Combined pathway probability: 0.05 × 0.02 × 0.80 = 0.0008 (0.08%)
Alternative Interpretation Adjustment: If Acting AG already counts as "serving," probability drops to near-zero (~0.01%) since Bailey already cannot be "first"
4. Key Blocking Factors
- Blanche is the official nominee with no indication of problems
- Bailey is currently employed in a different senior federal position (FBI)
- No public reporting suggests Bailey is under consideration
- Senate confirmation, while uncertain in timing, historically succeeds for AG nominees absent disqualifying issues
- The 1.85% market price already reflects extreme unlikelihood
5. Final Estimate I estimate 0.5% probability (0.005), which is actually LOWER than the current market price of 1.85%.
The market may be slightly overpricing this due to:
- Uncertainty about resolution criteria interpretation
- General "anything can happen in Trump administration" premium
- Liquidity/speculation premium on low-probability events
My estimate assumes ~90% chance that Acting AG status already disqualifies Bailey from being "first" (making true probability ~0.01%), and ~10% chance that only confirmed AG counts (making pathway probability ~0.8% conditional on that interpretation).
Weighted estimate: 0.90 × 0.0001 + 0.10 × 0.008 = 0.0009 + 0.0008 = 0.0017 ≈ 0.2%
Being slightly conservative with uncertainty: 0.5% estimated probability
Key Factors.
Todd Blanche is already Acting AG and formal nominee - he is the clear frontrunner with Senate confirmation in progress
Andrew Bailey has no apparent connection to AG consideration and is employed in different role (FBI Co-Deputy Director)
Historical base rate: <5% failure rate for presidential AG nominees absent major scandal
Resolution criteria ambiguity: unclear if 'Acting AG' status already disqualifies Bailey from being 'first new person'
No public reporting of Senate opposition to Blanche or any consideration of Bailey for AG
Bailey would be one of many alternative candidates if Blanche nomination failed - not obvious next choice
Scenarios.
Base Case: Blanche Confirmed as AG (Bailey Never Considered)
92%Todd Blanche successfully completes Senate confirmation process and becomes permanent Attorney General. Andrew Bailey continues in his FBI Co-Deputy Director role. Market resolves NO because Blanche (not Bailey) was the first new person to serve as AG after Bondi.
Trigger: Senate confirmation vote for Blanche occurs (likely within 4-12 weeks). No withdrawal of nomination, no major scandal emerges, no Senate opposition coalesces. This is the overwhelming consensus scenario.
Moderate Bear Case: Blanche Nomination Fails, Different Candidate Selected
8%Blanche nomination is withdrawn or rejected by Senate due to unexpected opposition or disqualifying information. Trump nominates someone OTHER than Andrew Bailey (e.g., another loyalist, different state AG, prominent lawyer). Market resolves NO because Bailey was not selected.
Trigger: Senate opposition emerges (e.g., ethics concerns, past case controversies). Trump pulls nomination or Senate votes down. New nominee announced who is not Andrew Bailey. Historically, AG nominees have high confirmation rates, but Trump's second term has seen turnover (Bondi firing).
Bull Case: Blanche Fails AND Bailey Selected
1%Blanche nomination collapses AND Trump specifically chooses Andrew Bailey as replacement nominee AND Bailey is confirmed by Senate. This requires multiple low-probability events to chain together. Bailey would need to be pulled from FBI leadership role.
Trigger: Blanche nomination withdrawn/rejected. Trump announces Andrew Bailey as new AG nominee (would require Bailey to have strong relationship with Trump and be preferred over dozens of other candidates). Senate confirms Bailey. Each step is individually unlikely.
Risks.
Resolution criteria interpretation: If 'Acting AG' doesn't count as 'serving,' probability increases slightly but still remains very low
Unexpected Blanche scandal or disqualifying information could emerge during confirmation hearings
Trump administration unpredictability: Trump has already fired one AG (Bondi) and could change preferences
Hidden information: Bailey may have closer relationship with Trump than public reporting suggests
Senate dynamics: Unknown opposition could emerge from confirmation process
Market microstructure: 1.85% price may reflect illiquidity, speculation, or insider information not captured in public sources
Temporal risk: Long resolution window (until Jan 2029) creates many scenarios where Blanche could be replaced later, though market asks specifically about 'first new person'
Edge Assessment.
WEAK EDGE - Market appears reasonably calibrated. Current market odds of 1.85% vs my estimate of 0.5% suggests market is slightly overpricing this outcome, but the difference is small in absolute terms (1.35 percentage points). The market's higher price may reflect:
- Legitimate uncertainty about resolution criteria interpretation
- Rational premium for Trump administration unpredictability given recent AG turnover
- Liquidity premium on low-probability event
- Possible private information about Senate confirmation challenges
The edge is not strong enough to recommend significant position sizing. At best, this is a mild 'NO' (betting against Bailey) opportunity, but transaction costs and capital lockup until 2029 likely negate the small edge. Market pricing seems appropriately skeptical of Bailey's chances while acknowledging non-zero possibility of nomination failure and alternative selection.
Recommendation: No strong edge. Market is approximately correctly priced for this extremely low-probability event.
What Would Change Our Mind.
Todd Blanche's nomination is withdrawn or rejected by the Senate due to scandal, ethics concerns, or unexpected opposition
Public reporting emerges showing Andrew Bailey is under serious consideration for Attorney General or has had recent discussions with Trump about the position
Senate confirmation hearings reveal significant obstacles to Blanche's confirmation (e.g., key senators announce opposition)
Market clarification that Acting AG status does NOT count as 'serving' for resolution purposes, making Bailey technically eligible to be 'first new person'
Evidence emerges of a closer relationship between Bailey and Trump than currently known, suggesting Bailey would be Trump's preferred alternative to Blanche
Trump publicly expresses dissatisfaction with Blanche or signals he is reconsidering the nomination
Sources.
- Senate Confirmation Process - Todd Blanche AG Nomination (June 2026)
- FBI Leadership Structure - Andrew Bailey as Co-Deputy Director
- DOJ Leadership Timeline - Bondi Firing and Blanche Appointment
- FOMC Meeting Statement - June 16-17, 2026 (Warsh's First Meeting)
- BLS Consumer Price Index - May 2026
- Employment Situation Summary - May 2026
- CME FedWatch Tool - June 2026 Meeting Expectations
- Fed Governor Christopher Waller Speech - Late May 2026
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