Will Israel launch a major ground offensive in Lebanon by March 31?

This is essentially a resolved event. The analysis is temporally grounded to March 25, 2026, and the research shows conclusively that the event in question already occurred on March 16, 2026 - nine days ago and fifteen days before the resolution deadline.

Base Rate Consideration: Historical base rates are not applicable here because this is not a prediction - the event has already occurred. This is a verification question rather than a forecasting exercise.

Event Verification Against Resolution Criteria:

1. Timing requirement (by March 31, 2026): ✓ CLEARLY MET

   • Operation began March 16, 2026
   • 15 days before the deadline

2. Troop threshold (>1,000 ground forces): ✓ MASSIVELY EXCEEDED

   • Three IDF Divisions deployed (91st, 210th, 146th)
   • Israeli divisions typically comprise 10,000-20,000 soldiers each
   • Estimated 30,000-60,000 total forces (30-60x the threshold)

3. Territory requirement (not under Israeli control at start): ✓ CLEARLY MET

   • Objective: Secure territory up to Litani River (~30km north of border)
   • Prior Israeli presence: Only five strategic outposts along Blue Line from November 2024 ceasefire
   • Current operation extends well beyond existing buffer zones into territory not previously controlled

4. "Major" offensive criterion: ✓ UNAMBIGUOUS

   • Described as "protracted" by IDF Chief Zamir
   • Defense Minister Katz confirms intent to "occupy southern Lebanon up to Litani River"
   • 50+ villages evacuated, 1,000+ killed, ~1 million displaced (20% of Lebanon's population)
   • Explicitly excludes "smaller raids, special operations, or limited incursions" - this is clearly none of those

5. Consensus of credible reporting: ✓ ACHIEVED

   • Multiple independent sources: Reuters, Axios, Time, The Guardian, ACLED
   • All confirm same start date, scope, and scale
   • Official Israeli government statements corroborate
   • No conflicting reports identified

Why not 1.0 probability? The minuscule remaining uncertainty (0.01%) accounts for:

• Possible future definitional disputes about whether the operation technically qualifies as "major" (extremely unlikely given three-division deployment)
• Potential for sources to later retract or correct reporting (extremely unlikely given consensus and official confirmations)
• Unknown unknowns in market resolution mechanics

The current market odds of 0.9995 (99.95%) are appropriately calibrated for what is essentially a historical fact at this point.

NO EDGE - Market is correctly priced. The current market odds of 0.9995 (99.95%) vs. my estimate of 0.9999 (99.99%) represent a difference of only 0.0004 (0.04 percentage points). This is essentially rounding-error level variance on what is a historical fact at this point.

The market has efficiently incorporated the information that this event already occurred on March 16, 2026. Both the market and this analysis agree this is >99.9% certain to resolve YES.

There is no meaningful betting edge here. The tiny remaining uncertainty in both the market price and this estimate reflects only:

1. Definitional dispute risk (negligible)
2. Source retraction risk (negligible)
3. Unknown resolution mechanics issues (negligible)

This is one of the most efficient market pricings possible - when an event has clearly already occurred with overwhelming documentation, both market participants and analysts converge on ~99.95-99.99% probability. The 0.01-0.05% held back is rational humility about unknown unknowns, not genuine uncertainty about the facts.

Recommendation: No value in betting either direction. If forced to bet, YES offers microscopically better value (0.9999 true vs 0.9995 market = tiny edge), but transaction costs would dwarf any expected value from a 0.04% edge.